Misperception and the Ukraine Crisis, Part I

T he most alarming thing about Russia’s recent actions in Crimea and the crisis atmosphere surrounding the whole ordeal is the sheer lack of accurate information available concerning the most basic facts on the ground. “Hard news” about the crisis is hard to come by. This has me thinking a lot of Robert Jervis’ classic work Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

Jervis examines how decision-makers with imperfect information form perceptions of events and other actors (leaders, states, etc.) that often significantly diverge from reality. Misperception covers an array of commonplace cognitive biases that affect the way people see the world and make decisions. In international politics, the dangers of misperception are high because decision-makers, who have armed forces and ballistic missiles at their disposal, are required to assess uncertain situations and make judgments about the hostile intentions of other states. Misperception can cause a leader to escalate a crisis or start a war he otherwise might not have if he had an accurate perception of the situation. Accordingly, misperception has been found by many scholars to have caused numerous conflicts.

Nearly all of the media reporting and commentary on the Ukraine crisis I can find seem to be operating off of hysterical one-sided assumptions and unfounded speculation. I can’t help but see the sources of misperception at work. For instance, we don’t even know for sure if the armed men in unmarked uniforms surrounding Ukrainian military bases in Crimea are actually even Russian soldiers. There were early reports that they were pro-Russia militiamen or security contractors. Almost a week later, their true identities remain ambiguous and unconfirmed. Nevertheless, most reporters and analysts have simply ignored this information and identified them as Russian troops. Even if they are Russian soldiers, the unmarked uniforms aspect raises a lot of questions about Russia’s intentions that no one even seems interested in asking (or answering).  

In any case, how can we expect decision-makers to clearly perceive the situation in Ukraine and make sound policy choices with such incomplete information? We may hope that behind the scenes there are various intelligence agencies busy filling in the blanks. This assumes, however, that decision-makers are actually listening and using intelligence to craft policy. Historians tell us that this rarely, if ever, occurs. Moreover, misperception is not directly linked to the quality of information available but how a decision-maker uses their values, beliefs and expectations to process and interpret incoming information. While awareness and better information about the intentions of others can help reduce misperception, the cognitive sources of misperception can never be entirely eliminated.

Regrettably, building a decent study on how a decision-maker perceived a situation requires rigorous historical evidence. We won’t really know what is running through the thoughts and across the desks of Barack Obama, John Kerry, or even Vladimir Putin until many years from now. In the meantime, I thought it might be fun to see if Jervis can help identify any potential misperceptions by some of the most widely read foreign policy pundits, commentators, and reporters in their takes on the Ukraine crisis.

Jervis does not systematically identify all the types of misperceptions in his book  and some may seem to fit several different categories because umbrella misperceptions like cognitive consistency encompass more specific misperceptions.  I’ve plucked some of the more common misperceptions from the text, labeled them if need be, and placed the potential cases of misperception beneath them.

Cognitive Consistency 
“…the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information into pre-existing images."

Sadly, this case provides another vivid reminder of why tough-minded realism is a better guide to foreign policy than feckless liberal idealism or neoconservative bluster. [R]ealism tells you major powers care a lot about security and are often ruthless in defending vital interests, especially close to home. It recognizes that great powers ignore international law when it gets in their way, and it sees relations between major powers as a ceaseless struggle for position, even when that struggle is waged for essentially defensive reasons.

—— Steve Walt, Realist, Harvard University

Foreign Policy

 No Contest

Belief That The Other Understands You Are Not A Threat
"…actors injure others more than they mean to because they do not see the degree to which their policies conflict with the other’s interests…when the actor believes he is not a threat to another, he usually assumes that the other knows he is not hostile."

Some ideas [NATO should] consider would include: …Providing advice to Ukrainian armed forces to prepare and position themselves in the event of further conflict. …Bringing the NATO Response Force, a 25,000-man sea, air, land, and special forces capability, to a higher state of alert. …Sailing NATO maritime forces into the Black Sea and setting up contingency plans for their use. Many will consider any level of NATO involvement provocative and potentially inflammatory. Unfortunately, the stakes are high and the Russians are moving. Sitting idle, without at least looking at options, is a mistake for NATO and would itself constitute a signal to Putin -- one that he would welcome.

—— U.S. Adm. James Stavridis (ret.), Fmr. Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Foreign Policy

NATO Needs to Move Now on Crimea: Action may provoke -- but so does doing nothing.

We have to make absolutely clear that Russian military intervention in other regions of Ukraine is a red line that will mean war with Ukrainian and NATO military forces if it is crossed. U.S. and NATO naval forces need to be deployed to the Black Sea in close proximity to the Ukrainian Coast. Military forces of neighboring NATO member countries, meanwhile, should be deployed closer to the Ukrainian border…Directly confronting Putin would not be as risky as many fear – Putin is, after all, a calculating opportunist who will take advantage of weakness where he sees it. He is extremely unlikely, therefore, to risk war if he clearly understands the "cost" of crossing a real red line. The question is whether he has any belief that the United States and its allies will step up.

—— Andrew Kuchins, Director, Russia and Eurasia Program

Center for Strategic and International Studies

U.S. credibility at stake in Ukraine

Overestimating Your Importance as Influence or Target 
“Actors exaggerate the degree to which they play a central role in other’s policies.”

…We can be relatively certain that one of the reasons that Putin has taken the action he has -- why he has felt free to order troops into Crimea and indeed why he has felt so free to meddle in the affairs of Ukraine since the beginning of the current crisis -- is because he has felt there would be no consequences -- at least none serious enough to dissuade him. This is the message that America's recent foreign-policy actions -- or rather its relative inaction and fecklessness -- from Syria to the Central Africa Republic, from Egypt to Anbar province, from the East China Sea to the Black Sea, have helped to send.

—— David Rothkopf, Editor at Large

Foreign Policy

A World Without Consequences

[Putin’s] calculus was not only a judgment on Obama’s foreign policy skill set, but it plainly included such a judgment, and it’s strange to think that recent U.S.-Russian entanglements played no role in shaping it.

—— Russ Douthat, Columnist

The New York Times

Five Theses on Ukraine

Disregarding the Internal Divisions of Others 
“Decision-makers tend to overestimate the centralization of the other’s policies even if they are familiar with the other’s domestic politics and elite divisions.”

Secure at home, Putin also fears little backlash from abroad. He believes the United States and Europe will publicly condemn Russia but implement few economic sanctions because Europe remains dependent on Russian natural gas.

—— David Rohde, Reporter

The Atlantic

 Crimea: The Greatest Challenge to Geopolitics Since the Cold War

The legislators in the Russian parliament today parroted those features of modern Putinism. In order to justify the invasion of the Crimean peninsula, they repeatedly cited the threat of Ukrainian “fascists” in Kiev helping Russia’s enemies. They repeatedly echoed the need to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine—a theme consonant with the Kremlin’s rhetoric about Russians everywhere, including the Baltic States…If this is the logic of the Russian invasion, the military incursion is unlikely to stop in Crimea: nearly all of eastern Ukraine is Russian-speaking. Russia defines its interests far beyond its Black Sea fleet and the Crimean peninsula.

—— David Remnick, Editor

The New Yorker

Putin Goes To War

Over Determining Personality 
“…Observers see others as autonomous causes of their own behavior…the tendency to perceive persons as origins and to ascribe changes in [state] behavior entirely to persons, ignoring external influences.”

Why is Putin doing this? Because he can. That's it, that's all you need to know…As soon as the revolution in Kiev happened, there was an unhappy rumbling in the Crimea, which has a large Russian population and is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It was a small rumbling, but just big enough for Russia to exploit. And when such an opportunity presents itself, one would be foolish not to take it, especially if one's name is Vladimir Putin. 

—— Julia Ioffe, Senior Editor

New Republic

      Putin's War in Crimea Could Soon Spread to Eastern Ukraine

Irrational Consistency 
“When a person believes that a policy contributes to one value, he is likely to believe that it also contributes to several other values, even though there is no reason why the world should be constructed in such a neat and helpful manner…belief systems thus often display overkill.”

Ironically, showing leadership now in our response to the Russian intervention in the Crimea is likely to get the attention of our friends in the Middle East. It cannot be a substitute for what we do in the Middle East but it can open a new conversation with the Saudis and others…. But launching a new conversation [in the Middle East] will be far harder if the U.S. does not appear to come up with an effective strategy that imposes consequences for Putin’s act of aggression against Ukraine.

——Dennis Ross, Fmr. Clinton Middle East Envoy

New Republic

 How Ukraine Will Shape the Future of the Middle East

Failure to Recognize Interest Trade-offs 
“…the decision-maker fails to recognize the trade-offs between advancing his interests and harming those of others. Since he does not believe that his policy is creating legitimate grievances, he underestimates the opposition that arises and sees resistance to his actions as unprovoked hostility that indicates aggressive intentions."

What Putin misunderstands most is that the center of gravity for the former Soviet Union has shifted west…Ukraine was set to join this movement toward the European Union last November when Yanukovych suddenly suspended trade and financial talks with the E.U. and accepted what amounted to a $15 billion bribe from Putin to stay in Russia’s camp. To the tens of thousands of courageous Ukrainians who braved the cold and police brutality to protest, Yanukovych’s submission to Moscow looked like an attempt to reverse history.

——David Ignatius, Columnist

The Washington Post

Putin’s error in Ukraine is the kind that leads to catastrophe

Categorization 
“The label placed on an event or idea influence the way it is seen…this choice encourages the person to see further resemblances between the object and others in the same category.”

As Russia conducts direct military intervention in Ukraine, the US and Europe condemn it, and the Ukrainian army goes on high alert, we're witnessing the most seismic geopolitical events since 9/11.

——Ian Bremmer, President and Founder of Eurasia Group

Business Insider

We're Witnessing The Most Seismic Geopolitical Events Since 9/11

Cognitive Dissonance 
“People seek to believe that the reasons for acting or deciding as they did were overwhelming…After making a decision, a person not only will downgrade or misinterpret discrepant information but will also avoid it and seek consonant information."

Putin’s quick move to a war footing suggests a different view — one in which, particularly in Russia’s back yard, the Cold War rivalry Putin was raised on is thriving. The Russian president has made restoring his country’s international prestige the overarching goal of his foreign policy, and he has embraced military force as the means to do so.

—— Scott Wilson, Chief White House Correspondent

The Washington Post

Ukraine Crisis Tests Obama’s Foreign Policy Focus…

Why has Russia chosen to gamble its trillion-dollar ties with the West? Russia’s elites have exposed themselves in a gigantic manner – everything they hold dear is now locked up in European properties and bank accounts…Theoretically, this makes them vulnerable. The EU could, with a sudden rush of money-laundering investigations and visa bans, cut them off from their wealth. …. Russia is confident there will be no Western economic counterattack….He knows that European bureaucrats will issue shrill statements and then get back to business helping Russian elites buy London town houses and French chateaux. He knows full well that the United States can no longer force Europe to trade in a different way. He knows full well that the United States can do nothing beyond theatrical military maneuvers at most. This is why Vladimir Putin just invaded Crimea. He thinks he has nothing to lose.

—— Ben Judah, Author

Politico

Why Russia No Longer Fears the West

Underestimating Coincidences 
It is common for a decision-maker to see a set of events as being planned rather than coincidental. “Of special interest is that the movement of military forces are almost always seen as supporting foreign policies.”

Russia said it test-fired an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile on Tuesday, a planned event that timing of which was still called into question by United States officials because of the ongoing Ukraine crisis….The timing, the military officials agreed, appeared “suspicious but not threatening.”…"This was a previously notified and routine test launch of an ICBM as required under the New START Treaty, Russia provided advance notification of this launch to the United States," National Security Council spokesperson Caitlin Hayden said in a statement.

—— Jim Miklaszewski, Chief Pentagon Correspondent

Robert Windrem, Investigative Reporter

NBC News

Russia's Test-Firing of ICBM Planned, But 'Suspicious'

The Other Side of the Story: The Failed Deal in Ukraine and Russia’s Military Intervention

T he foreign policy pundits in Washington are fast at work framing Russia’s recent military incursion into the Crimea as a move to crush a popular democratic revolution that has rejected its domination. Or that Russian President Vladimir Putin has always been hell bent on reestablishing the old Soviet empire (or alternatively, that Putin doesn’t understand the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union lost). Or that the Russian government and/or Putin are inherently untrustworthy and are continuing a long-established policy of unprovoked aggression against their neighbors. Or that Russia’s actions are intended to expose the United States (or President Obama) for their weakness and demonstrate Russia’s power on the global stage. All of this, of course, is analytically useless if you actually want to understand Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine, make decent predictions about what it will do next, or craft a good policy response. 

Rather than debate if the United States misjudged Russia’s predispositions (underlying motivations and goals) to intervene in Ukraine, I believe the United States has woefully misunderstood Russia’s situation in Ukraine. By examining the events that led up to the fall of the Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, I believe Russia’s actions can be best understood given the situation it was left in after the failure of the EU (and the United States to a lesser extent) to make the opposition in Ukraine live up to its end of a peace deal struck over a week ago with Moscow’s man in Kiev.

Wait a minute. There was a peace deal? Yes, there was.

In all of the discussions over Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine over the past few days, nearly everyone has conveniently skipped over the fact that a peace deal was signed over a week ago which aimed to end the months long crisis in Ukraine. EU diplomats brokered the deal on February 21 between Ukraine’s pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych and the leaders of the main opposition parties friendlier to the EU and United States. The deal was endorsed by the United States, the EU, and Russia. It was supposed to bring the political crisis in Kiev to a face saving end for everyone. But the deal abruptly collapsed in less than a day. Since then, it has received scant mention apart from the stern demands of Russian officials that the terms be enforced. But apparently no one in Washington or Brussels is listening.

That said, I should point out that I have no personal sympathy for Putin or the Russian government. It is an analyst’s job to see situations from other countries’ perspectives to better understand the situation they are in and the actions they take. Often, analysts avoid exploring other countries’ perspectives because makes it makes them uncomfortable to see their own country from a potentially negative light. Most of the time, it is simply unpopular to be the one who points out that maybe an adversary has a legitimate point. As an American, it is also easy to come up with bland arguments explaining while condemning Russian military interventions anywhere and at any time. But easy doesn’t interest me.

So here it goes:

On February 21, following several days of street battles in which 80 anti-government protesters and 20 police were killed, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland convened late-night talks in Kiev between Moscow’s man, President Viktor Yanukovych, and the three main opposition leaders to reach a deal to end the unrest. During the meeting, Yanukovych gave the opposition several significant concessions regarding early elections and the formation of a national coalition government.

The opposition leaders, perhaps fearing a backlash from their own followers and the protesters in the street, seemed to have hesitated at cutting any kind of agreement that kept Yanukovych in power. The European ministers exerted heavy pressure on them to accept a deal with Yanukovych. The Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski was caught on tape telling the opposition leaders, "…if you don’t support this you'll have martial law, you'll have the army. You will all be dead."

After several hours of negotiations, Yanukovych and the opposition leaders signed a sweeping power sharing deal (full text available here) on February 21. There was even a signing ceremony. The key terms of deal stated that Yanukovych would remain in power but would form a national coalition government with the opposition within ten days, constitutional reforms would be adopted by parliament to weaken the president’s powers, and an early presidential election would be held by the end of 2014. Andrew Wilson, a Ukraine expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, described the deal as a “surprisingly good agreement” that paved the way for a “controlled collapse” of the Yanukovych regime rather than a chaotic collapse.

The Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland signed the deal as observers (and guarantors) and the EU hailed it as a breakthrough towards ending Ukraine’s political crisis and violence.

It appears the United States did not have someone in the room (for reasons unknown). In any case, the United States praised the deal and indicated it was working with the EU to implement the deal.  The State Department said the deal was, “…consistent with what [the United States] has been calling for some time: a de-escalation of violence, constitutional change, formation of a coalition government, and indeed early elections.”

Moscow’s response to the deal was quiet but tacitly cooperative. A Russian representative, Vladamir Lukin, the Russian Human Rights Commissioner and Special

Representative had joined the negotiations part way through (I cannot find why he or another Russian representative wasn’t there to begin with). Lukin did not sign the deal along with the EU Ministers. But he did not reject it. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said that Russia had played a "constructive role" in achieving the deal. Shortly after the signing, Lukin returned to Moscow and told the press, “Certain questions still remain, consultations will continue, this is a normal process.”

It appears that Moscow was not exactly thrilled with the deal and was concerned that Yanukovych’s power might slip too far, too fast.  but it was willing to accept it (a statement released by Yanukovych’s office before the signing indicated the deal had won Russia’s support, but it’s not entirely clear). The agreement kept Yanukovych in power, albeit weakened, at least until the end of the year when a presidential election would be held.  This would provide Moscow much needed time to reorganize the pro-Russia political parties in Ukraine, which had been weakened during the crisis by the factionalism and high-level defections. Perhaps most important was the fact the deal would bring a quick end to the political crisis in Kiev on terms acceptable to the United States and EU while not dealing Putin a public defeat.

On February 21, several hours after the deal was signed in Kiev, Obama called Putin from the White House and the two spoke for over an hour. According to the official White House readout, Obama and Putin, “exchanged views on the need to implement quickly the political agreement reached today in Kyiv, the importance of stabilizing the economic situation and undertaking necessary reforms, and the need for all sides to refrain from further violence.” (They also talked about Iran, Syria, and the Olympics although it is unclear if these issues were discussed separately.) Nevertheless, two leaders “exchanging views” leaves it a bit vague if Putin was on board or not. According to several sources which each quote either an “unnamed U.S. official,” a “senior State Department official,” and a “top White House official,” (who all appear to be Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes or Tony Blinken) Putin had agreed to the deal while on the phone with Obama and that the Russians were on board for quickly implementing the agreement.

Hours after the peace deal was signed, the Ukrainian Parliament met in an extraordinary session to begin implementing aspects of the peace deal. The ranks of the opposition lawmakers were buoyed by defections from members of Yanukovych’s ruling political party who sought to distance themselves from the increasingly unpopular president. During the session, the parliament passed a law outside of the deal’s terms—but demanded by the protesters—which sacked Yanukovych’s Interior Minister Vitali Zakharchenko who had ordered the police to fire on protesters and ordered the large number of riot police in Kiev to disarm and pull back.

The withdrawal of the riot police from Kiev’s streets left little physical security between Yanukovych (he apparently had nothing more a small personal security detachment) and the throngs of protesters who would have liked nothing more than to put his head on a pike. Yanukovych and several of his cabinet members including Zakharchenko likely realized what would happen once the police were fully withdrawn and left Kiev. Yanukovych traveled to the eastern city of Kharkiv (he claimed that his car was shot at in Kiev and his life was threatened).

By late afternoon on February 22, the protesters realized that the riot police surrounding Independence Square and those who were protecting other government buildings, including the presidential compound and the parliament building, were retreating. The police were either obeying parliament’s orders to stand down or otherwise deserting once they realized Yanukovych and Zakharchenko had left. The protesters, some of them armed, seized government buildings around the capital and celebrated Yanukovych’s flight. But Yanukovych had not resigned or legally vacated his office. He had only physically left (or “fled” as the media put it) the capital. At this point, the agreement was still intact, but the situation had grown far more complicated with Yanukovych’s absence and the withdrawal of the police.

The Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland had privately told the opposition leaders not to take any additional steps for 48 hours after signing the agreement with Yanukovych. But as the parliament geared up for another session, the opposition again flaunted the EU’s warnings. According to Yaroslav Ginka, an opposition MP, “We were feeling the growing frustration from protesters on the streets. The atmosphere among them was so tense that we knew there was no time for waiting left and they would storm the parliament building if something were not done as soon as possible.” Capitalizing on Yanukovych’s absence and perhaps seeking to appease the street, the parliament voted unanimously to impeach and remove Yanukovych from office. The parliament announced the formation of a new government led by the opposition leaders, moved up the election schedule, and issued an arrest warrant for Yanukovych. These actions, of course, were in complete violation of the EU brokered deal (and on somewhat dubious legal grounds).

The news of Yanukovych’s impeachment was met by an eerily silence from Washington and Brussels for hours if not an entire day or so.  My guess is that behind closed doors, U.S. and EU diplomats frantically tried to first prevent the impeachment vote and then frivolously attempted to convince the opposition to reverse course, knowing full well that the Russians would blow a gasket after having received U.S. and EU assurances that a deal was in place less than 24 hours prior.

To be fair, however, what could the United States and the EU do at that point? Denounce the opposition’s clear violation of the Feb. 21 deal and publically pressure them, in conjunction with the Kremlin, in an attempt to spare Yanukovych’s presidency? That’d be pretty bad domestic politics for the Obama administration and every European government involved. (It’s not hard to imagine what John McCain would have to say about that on Meet the Press.) Within the week, the United States and the European Union dropped any mention of the Feb. 21 agreement and embraced the new opposition-led government as legitimate and denounced Yanukovych. But in doing so, they too reneged on the Feb. 21 deal.