Obama’s Trail Balloon: The Politics of the “Zero Option” in Afghanistan

A few days ago, the Times ran an interesting story quoting senior U.S. and European officials in Washington and Kabul that the Obama administration is giving very serious consideration to pulling all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The impetus for the change in the administration’s thinking is attributed (in the article) to the deteriorating relationship between President Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. According to officials, Karzai threw a fit to Obama during a video conference related to the announcement last month that the United States and the Taliban were planning to hold peace talks without the Afghan Government. The “zero option” is, of course, contrary to several years of pledges by the United States that it plans to leave a small residual force of troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, mostly to train the Afghan security forces and conduct counter-terrorism operations. Many military analysts would agree some residual U.S. force as critically necessary to prevent the Afghan government falling to the insurgency, particularly in lieu of a peace deal with the Taliban (something that won’t happen, but that’s a whole other post).

Of course, attributing the administration’s change of thinking on the zero option in the White House due to one bad video conference between Obama and Karzai is ridiculous. Obama’s personal relationship with Karzai has always been rocky, if not downright terrible. Remember, Karzai’s attitude did not deter Obama from sending tens of thousands of additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009. Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) suggested the discussions of the zero option were a part of the Obama administration’s negotiating strategy with Karzai related to the Status of Forces Agreement that would dictate terms of the U.S. presence after 2014. Levin said, “I think it’s a signal that he thinks he has leverage that he doesn’t have.” I very much doubt that the Obama administration would float the zero option as part of a negotiating strategy with Karzai. Karzai has plenty of unflattering qualities, but he has never struck me as a complete and utter fool. He knows he has little to no leverage with the United States (except perhaps, embarrassing Obama in public).  After all, the United States pays for the entire budget of the Afghan government, including its military, and has tens of thousands of troops on Afghan soil. This does not leave Karzai a whole lot of negotiating room.

Rather than aimed at Karzai, I would venture to guess the story given to the Times by anonymous officials within the Obama administration that discussions of the zero option were taking place was in essence a trial balloon. Obama and his advisers wanted to gauge what the domestic political reaction of hawkish Republicans and Democrats would be to the zero option. I think absent domestic politics, Obama’s preferred policy in Afghanistan would be the zero option. After all, it is not exactly a secret that Obama has basically no interest in furthering U.S. involvement in the war. Further, I suspect (apparently along with others) that he privately regrets his decision on the surge way back in 2009. Interestingly, the reaction to the administration’s discussions by hawkish Republicans and Democrats was muted. As far as I can tell, there was little outrage, no attacks, and no repercussions for Obama.  

These domestic political maneuvers we are seeing over U.S. Afghan policy reminded me of something I wrote back in the fall of 2011 on the domestic politics of Obama’s Afghan strategy that seems pretty accurate:

…Obama will need to forge a stronger coalition with moderates and doves on a withdrawal timetable in Afghanistan beyond 2014 if he wants significant congressional backing for his war strategy. This may become increasingly difficult after of the 2012 election. If Obama wins reelection in 2012, he may face a Republican-controlled Senate and House which might dissuade Obama from a faster draw down if he is under pressure from a Republican Congress to extend it. There is an expectation from Republican hawks and many security analysts that the administration will live up to its word and leave a fairly large residual force in Afghanistan far beyond 2014 to support counter-terrorism operations and training the Afghan security forces. If Obama is successful at forging a coalition with dove and moderate Democrats and Republicans towards ending U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, there will likely be intense political pressure to bring the number of troops to zero. While this may not preclude a large intelligence and/or special operations forces footprint remaining in Afghanistan beyond 2014, the domestic political momentum that would build up behind the troop withdrawals—as seen in Vietnam and Iraq—would be difficult for Obama to resist once they start; even if the conditions on the ground change unfavorably.

The Obama administration has said there is “no decision imminent” over the U.S. presence in Afghanistan after 2014. Nevertheless, I think it is very likely Obama will choose some form of the zero option given the tepid hawk reaction to the trail balloon. Obama’s decision will probably be a shock to a lot people in the Pentagon and Congress. It will probably be seen as a betrayal in Kabul. But if hawkish Republicans and Democrats are not going to push back at all, why shouldn’t Obama move more quickly to end America’s role in war he doesn’t want to fight?