The Other Side of the Story: The Failed Deal in Ukraine and Russia’s Military Intervention

T he foreign policy pundits in Washington are fast at work framing Russia’s recent military incursion into the Crimea as a move to crush a popular democratic revolution that has rejected its domination. Or that Russian President Vladimir Putin has always been hell bent on reestablishing the old Soviet empire (or alternatively, that Putin doesn’t understand the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union lost). Or that the Russian government and/or Putin are inherently untrustworthy and are continuing a long-established policy of unprovoked aggression against their neighbors. Or that Russia’s actions are intended to expose the United States (or President Obama) for their weakness and demonstrate Russia’s power on the global stage. All of this, of course, is analytically useless if you actually want to understand Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine, make decent predictions about what it will do next, or craft a good policy response. 

Rather than debate if the United States misjudged Russia’s predispositions (underlying motivations and goals) to intervene in Ukraine, I believe the United States has woefully misunderstood Russia’s situation in Ukraine. By examining the events that led up to the fall of the Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, I believe Russia’s actions can be best understood given the situation it was left in after the failure of the EU (and the United States to a lesser extent) to make the opposition in Ukraine live up to its end of a peace deal struck over a week ago with Moscow’s man in Kiev.

Wait a minute. There was a peace deal? Yes, there was.

In all of the discussions over Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine over the past few days, nearly everyone has conveniently skipped over the fact that a peace deal was signed over a week ago which aimed to end the months long crisis in Ukraine. EU diplomats brokered the deal on February 21 between Ukraine’s pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych and the leaders of the main opposition parties friendlier to the EU and United States. The deal was endorsed by the United States, the EU, and Russia. It was supposed to bring the political crisis in Kiev to a face saving end for everyone. But the deal abruptly collapsed in less than a day. Since then, it has received scant mention apart from the stern demands of Russian officials that the terms be enforced. But apparently no one in Washington or Brussels is listening.

That said, I should point out that I have no personal sympathy for Putin or the Russian government. It is an analyst’s job to see situations from other countries’ perspectives to better understand the situation they are in and the actions they take. Often, analysts avoid exploring other countries’ perspectives because makes it makes them uncomfortable to see their own country from a potentially negative light. Most of the time, it is simply unpopular to be the one who points out that maybe an adversary has a legitimate point. As an American, it is also easy to come up with bland arguments explaining while condemning Russian military interventions anywhere and at any time. But easy doesn’t interest me.

So here it goes:

On February 21, following several days of street battles in which 80 anti-government protesters and 20 police were killed, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland convened late-night talks in Kiev between Moscow’s man, President Viktor Yanukovych, and the three main opposition leaders to reach a deal to end the unrest. During the meeting, Yanukovych gave the opposition several significant concessions regarding early elections and the formation of a national coalition government.

The opposition leaders, perhaps fearing a backlash from their own followers and the protesters in the street, seemed to have hesitated at cutting any kind of agreement that kept Yanukovych in power. The European ministers exerted heavy pressure on them to accept a deal with Yanukovych. The Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski was caught on tape telling the opposition leaders, "…if you don’t support this you'll have martial law, you'll have the army. You will all be dead."

After several hours of negotiations, Yanukovych and the opposition leaders signed a sweeping power sharing deal (full text available here) on February 21. There was even a signing ceremony. The key terms of deal stated that Yanukovych would remain in power but would form a national coalition government with the opposition within ten days, constitutional reforms would be adopted by parliament to weaken the president’s powers, and an early presidential election would be held by the end of 2014. Andrew Wilson, a Ukraine expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, described the deal as a “surprisingly good agreement” that paved the way for a “controlled collapse” of the Yanukovych regime rather than a chaotic collapse.

The Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland signed the deal as observers (and guarantors) and the EU hailed it as a breakthrough towards ending Ukraine’s political crisis and violence.

It appears the United States did not have someone in the room (for reasons unknown). In any case, the United States praised the deal and indicated it was working with the EU to implement the deal.  The State Department said the deal was, “…consistent with what [the United States] has been calling for some time: a de-escalation of violence, constitutional change, formation of a coalition government, and indeed early elections.”

Moscow’s response to the deal was quiet but tacitly cooperative. A Russian representative, Vladamir Lukin, the Russian Human Rights Commissioner and Special

Representative had joined the negotiations part way through (I cannot find why he or another Russian representative wasn’t there to begin with). Lukin did not sign the deal along with the EU Ministers. But he did not reject it. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said that Russia had played a "constructive role" in achieving the deal. Shortly after the signing, Lukin returned to Moscow and told the press, “Certain questions still remain, consultations will continue, this is a normal process.”

It appears that Moscow was not exactly thrilled with the deal and was concerned that Yanukovych’s power might slip too far, too fast.  but it was willing to accept it (a statement released by Yanukovych’s office before the signing indicated the deal had won Russia’s support, but it’s not entirely clear). The agreement kept Yanukovych in power, albeit weakened, at least until the end of the year when a presidential election would be held.  This would provide Moscow much needed time to reorganize the pro-Russia political parties in Ukraine, which had been weakened during the crisis by the factionalism and high-level defections. Perhaps most important was the fact the deal would bring a quick end to the political crisis in Kiev on terms acceptable to the United States and EU while not dealing Putin a public defeat.

On February 21, several hours after the deal was signed in Kiev, Obama called Putin from the White House and the two spoke for over an hour. According to the official White House readout, Obama and Putin, “exchanged views on the need to implement quickly the political agreement reached today in Kyiv, the importance of stabilizing the economic situation and undertaking necessary reforms, and the need for all sides to refrain from further violence.” (They also talked about Iran, Syria, and the Olympics although it is unclear if these issues were discussed separately.) Nevertheless, two leaders “exchanging views” leaves it a bit vague if Putin was on board or not. According to several sources which each quote either an “unnamed U.S. official,” a “senior State Department official,” and a “top White House official,” (who all appear to be Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes or Tony Blinken) Putin had agreed to the deal while on the phone with Obama and that the Russians were on board for quickly implementing the agreement.

Hours after the peace deal was signed, the Ukrainian Parliament met in an extraordinary session to begin implementing aspects of the peace deal. The ranks of the opposition lawmakers were buoyed by defections from members of Yanukovych’s ruling political party who sought to distance themselves from the increasingly unpopular president. During the session, the parliament passed a law outside of the deal’s terms—but demanded by the protesters—which sacked Yanukovych’s Interior Minister Vitali Zakharchenko who had ordered the police to fire on protesters and ordered the large number of riot police in Kiev to disarm and pull back.

The withdrawal of the riot police from Kiev’s streets left little physical security between Yanukovych (he apparently had nothing more a small personal security detachment) and the throngs of protesters who would have liked nothing more than to put his head on a pike. Yanukovych and several of his cabinet members including Zakharchenko likely realized what would happen once the police were fully withdrawn and left Kiev. Yanukovych traveled to the eastern city of Kharkiv (he claimed that his car was shot at in Kiev and his life was threatened).

By late afternoon on February 22, the protesters realized that the riot police surrounding Independence Square and those who were protecting other government buildings, including the presidential compound and the parliament building, were retreating. The police were either obeying parliament’s orders to stand down or otherwise deserting once they realized Yanukovych and Zakharchenko had left. The protesters, some of them armed, seized government buildings around the capital and celebrated Yanukovych’s flight. But Yanukovych had not resigned or legally vacated his office. He had only physically left (or “fled” as the media put it) the capital. At this point, the agreement was still intact, but the situation had grown far more complicated with Yanukovych’s absence and the withdrawal of the police.

The Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland had privately told the opposition leaders not to take any additional steps for 48 hours after signing the agreement with Yanukovych. But as the parliament geared up for another session, the opposition again flaunted the EU’s warnings. According to Yaroslav Ginka, an opposition MP, “We were feeling the growing frustration from protesters on the streets. The atmosphere among them was so tense that we knew there was no time for waiting left and they would storm the parliament building if something were not done as soon as possible.” Capitalizing on Yanukovych’s absence and perhaps seeking to appease the street, the parliament voted unanimously to impeach and remove Yanukovych from office. The parliament announced the formation of a new government led by the opposition leaders, moved up the election schedule, and issued an arrest warrant for Yanukovych. These actions, of course, were in complete violation of the EU brokered deal (and on somewhat dubious legal grounds).

The news of Yanukovych’s impeachment was met by an eerily silence from Washington and Brussels for hours if not an entire day or so.  My guess is that behind closed doors, U.S. and EU diplomats frantically tried to first prevent the impeachment vote and then frivolously attempted to convince the opposition to reverse course, knowing full well that the Russians would blow a gasket after having received U.S. and EU assurances that a deal was in place less than 24 hours prior.

To be fair, however, what could the United States and the EU do at that point? Denounce the opposition’s clear violation of the Feb. 21 deal and publically pressure them, in conjunction with the Kremlin, in an attempt to spare Yanukovych’s presidency? That’d be pretty bad domestic politics for the Obama administration and every European government involved. (It’s not hard to imagine what John McCain would have to say about that on Meet the Press.) Within the week, the United States and the European Union dropped any mention of the Feb. 21 agreement and embraced the new opposition-led government as legitimate and denounced Yanukovych. But in doing so, they too reneged on the Feb. 21 deal.

The First Image Problem and Understanding Iran

W hile following developments in U.S.-Iran relations in recent months, I have been struck by the contrasting depictions of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the impact of his personality and beliefs on Tehran’s policy towards the United States.

It seems every scholar, analyst, expert, and journalist offers a slightly different take on Khamenei’s personality, beliefs, and influence. 

It’s strange that such opposing assessments exist of the same individual (let alone someone as prominent as Khamenei). Moreover, I find it interesting why Khamenei’s personality and worldview—studied by outsiders by dissecting his mountain of writings and speeches—are rarely, if ever, compared to his actual political conduct and policies.

If indeed Khamenei is an idiosyncratic revolutionary hardliner, how can this image be reconciled with the evidence that suggests he is also a pragmatist? If Khamenei is believes that the United States and Israel are truly evil, why would he allow his government to strike a deal with the devil? How can Khamenei be an iron-fisted ruler who wields immutable authority, while it is known he has faced many domestic challengers to his position and influence? If Khamenei is Iran’s ultimate decision maker, why does he so rarely make decisions? If Khamenei’s word is law, why does he more often than not obfuscate his views to such an extent that even other Iranian leaders are puzzled as to where he stands?      

These competing images of Khamenei and the questions surrounding the impact of his beliefs on Tehran’s foreign policy are hardly unique. Rather, it raises broader questions about why political scientists still have so few answers when it comes to understanding the influence of individuals in international relations (which Kenneth Waltz referred to as the first image).

The U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal—What Took So Long?

  I have been doing some reading on the history of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations this week and stumbled across an interesting piece by Dan Joyner.   

Joyner argues out that none of the concessions Iran made at Geneva in November were new or represented a major shift in Iranian policy. He notes, “…none of them, and not even their sum, is beyond what Iran had already offered in past negotiations, going back at least to 2005.” 

Indeed, the Arms Control Association has an excellent timeline of diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program and another listing all of the past proposals from the parties over the years that supports his point. It seems like the general parameters of an U.S.-Iran nuclear deal have been sitting on the table for nearly a decade, which begs the question of what exactly took so long for the sides to sign off on it?

Yousaf Butt, a scientist from the Federation of American Scientists, attributes the recent breakthrough to “improved atmospherics” which made the deal suddenly doable. I think what Butt really means by “improved atmospherics” is a change in the domestic politics in Washington and Tehran. 

From my perspective, the domestic political calendars in both Washington and Tehran have been unfortunately timed for many years (if not decades) which has made moving towards cooperation politically tedious at home for each nation’s leadership until very recently.

This has left me with a few additional questions, thoughts and observations worth considering:

(1)   While Iran’s nuclear policy was often fluctuating and opaque, U.S. policy towards Iran seems to have undergone clear shifts from “no nuclear weapons” to “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” again which align nicely with the U.S. election cycle. Iran, of course, has never been willing to accept a zero enrichment deal. This was partly because Iran does have the legal right to enrich uranium as part of a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and partly because enrichment became a hotly debated political issue between Tehran’s hawks and doves.

(2)  Did the latest U.S. and international economic sanctions have the affect everyone seems to think they did and brought Tehran to its knees and caused a major shift in Iran’s position? Or were sanctions domestic political cover for the Obama administration to please hawks in Congress while subtly shifting U.S. policy from “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” while claiming the sanctions worked?

(3)  Did Hassan Rouhani’s election really make the difference? Or was it Obama’s reelection and the quick onset of being second-term lame duck president with a hostile Congress that won’t move his domestic agenda forward an inch? (Or was it both?)