Did Obama Deliberately Fail to Negotiate a Deal to Keep Troops in Iraq?

I n light of al-Qaeda’s recent gains and heightened sectarian violence in Iraq, President Obama has taken flack from many hawks in Congress for his failure to negotiate a long-term security agreement with Iraq that would have left U.S. forces in the country after 2011.

Yet the lack of a new security arrangement between the United States and Iraq was hardly a failure of diplomacy. While the Obama administration publicly supported the concept of keeping a residual force in Iraq; it deliberately failed to negotiate a new deal with Baghdad for domestic political reasons.

The hawks' attacks on this issue began over a week ago when Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsay Graham (R-SC) released a statement in which they severely admonished Obama for withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraq instead of leaving behind a residual force (a policy they strongly supported).

While most of the statement was boilerplate, it did contain a rather interesting and insightful tidbit:

Let it be clear that the Administration's narrative that Iraq's political leadership objected to U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after 2011 is patently false. We know firsthand that Iraq's main political blocs were supportive and that the Administration rejected sound military advice and squandered the opportunity to conclude a security agreement with Iraq that could have met U.S. military requirements..

Essentially two United States Senators are accusing the White House of concocting an entirely false account that a security agreement could not be reached because the Iraqis could not get their house in order.  

McCain and Graham don’t explicitly say why the Obama administration would do such a thing; but the sub-context is that the decision to withdrawal was politically motivated.

Oddly, I think McCain and Graham are pretty much correct. Here's why:

It is easy enough to see that it was in Obama’s domestic political interest to ensure every American in uniform was out of Iraq before the 2012 election. After all, it would be hard for Obama to claim he had fulfilled his campaign pledge and ended the Iraq War if there were still 10,000 or so troops stationed there.

The tricky part for Obama would be getting out of Iraq without seeming like he wanted to.

An overt policy to pull U.S. troops out before or at the end of 2011 without the support of Congressional hawks and the military would have looked cynical. It would have exposed Obama to blunt attacks that he was squandering the sacrifice of American blood and treasure, ignoring his military commanders, and allow his critics in the future to lay Iraq’s problems at his doorstep.

So there was little if any reason for the Obama administration to visibly go against the grain and oppose a long-term U.S. troop presence in Iraq. Such a political fight is best avoided if possible. And it was.

Rather, the Obama administration publicly supported the hawks and the military’s preferred policy for a residual force in Iraq. The administration’s support, however, was a political feint. I believe Obama wanted out of Iraq but masked his true policy preference in order to defuse criticism from the hawks while he maneuvered for a big political win with the moderates and doves long weary of the conflict.

Obama’s maneuver was brilliant in its simplicity: he would do nothing and let Iraq’s dysfunctional political system sink the prospects for a new security agreement. His hand would thus appear to be forced by Iraqi incompetence.

For years, the United States had taken on an indispensable and highly active role as the final arbitrator in Iraq’s chaotic politics. Even under Obama, the United States was routinely hammering together political agreements on issues large and small among the numerous Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish political factions who otherwise could agree on nothing but their mutual disdain for one another.

Yet when it came time to negotiate a new security agreement, the Obama administration did little if anything to ensure the Iraqis hashed out a deal amongst themselves over the arrangements' terms. The administration changed its tone just a bit, insisting it wanted to stay but only if the Iraqis could get their house in order on their own and ask.

The guiding hand of the United States which had brought a semblance of order and function to Iraq’s fragile government was suddenly lifted. U.S. officials merely watched from the sidelines as the Iraqis predictably spun their wheels over the issue and the calendar crept closer and closer to December 2011.

Once the deadline for a new deal expired in December 2011, Obama was able to pin the blame squarely on the Iraqis for being unable to get their ducks in a row on time. It's hard to imagine that if the United States—with all its power and influence in Iraq—had really wanted a deal it was incapable of twisting enough arms to get its way.

Nevertheless, Obama seized the opportunity to withdrawal the remaining U.S. forces under the political cover that absent a new agreement with Baghdad, he was merely following a timetable established by his Republican predecessor. Obama then took a bow during a national prime-time address in which he announced he had finally brought the war to a responsible and honorable end.

Oh well, just one more example of a sound policy abroad being sacrificed because it was bad domestic politics.

Assorted Interesting Links: 

Congress Wants to Kill Obama’s Iran Deal - Colum Lynch, John Hudson, Foreign Policy

Obama Threatens to Veto Iran Sanctions Bill - Howard LaFranchi, CSM

Iranian Hardline Faction Silent on Nuclear Deal - Thomas Erdbrink, New York Times

America Starts But Can’t Win Wars – Andrew J. Bacevich, LA Times