The U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal—What Took So Long?

  I have been doing some reading on the history of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations this week and stumbled across an interesting piece by Dan Joyner.   

Joyner argues out that none of the concessions Iran made at Geneva in November were new or represented a major shift in Iranian policy. He notes, “…none of them, and not even their sum, is beyond what Iran had already offered in past negotiations, going back at least to 2005.” 

Indeed, the Arms Control Association has an excellent timeline of diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program and another listing all of the past proposals from the parties over the years that supports his point. It seems like the general parameters of an U.S.-Iran nuclear deal have been sitting on the table for nearly a decade, which begs the question of what exactly took so long for the sides to sign off on it?

Yousaf Butt, a scientist from the Federation of American Scientists, attributes the recent breakthrough to “improved atmospherics” which made the deal suddenly doable. I think what Butt really means by “improved atmospherics” is a change in the domestic politics in Washington and Tehran. 

From my perspective, the domestic political calendars in both Washington and Tehran have been unfortunately timed for many years (if not decades) which has made moving towards cooperation politically tedious at home for each nation’s leadership until very recently.

This has left me with a few additional questions, thoughts and observations worth considering:

(1)   While Iran’s nuclear policy was often fluctuating and opaque, U.S. policy towards Iran seems to have undergone clear shifts from “no nuclear weapons” to “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” again which align nicely with the U.S. election cycle. Iran, of course, has never been willing to accept a zero enrichment deal. This was partly because Iran does have the legal right to enrich uranium as part of a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and partly because enrichment became a hotly debated political issue between Tehran’s hawks and doves.

(2)  Did the latest U.S. and international economic sanctions have the affect everyone seems to think they did and brought Tehran to its knees and caused a major shift in Iran’s position? Or were sanctions domestic political cover for the Obama administration to please hawks in Congress while subtly shifting U.S. policy from “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” while claiming the sanctions worked?

(3)  Did Hassan Rouhani’s election really make the difference? Or was it Obama’s reelection and the quick onset of being second-term lame duck president with a hostile Congress that won’t move his domestic agenda forward an inch? (Or was it both?)

Domestic Wrangling Over Iran Deal Continues (Short Links)

C urrently 59 senators (43 Republicans and 16 Democrats) support a bill sponsored by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Mark Kirk (R-IL) that would impose extensive new sanctions on Tehran if no final nuclear accord is reached or if it violates the interim deal (Note: Lawmakers still have not been provided the specifics of the interim deal from the White House). (Washington Post)

According to The Hill, “Every Democrat considered vulnerable in his or her race for reelection next year is co-sponsoring this measure, a sign that they want to appear tough on foreign policy.” Furthermore, “The new Menendez-Kirk bill would also require that any final deal with Iran end its ability to enrich uranium. Secretary of State John Kerry has suggested that such a requirement was a nonstarter for Iran.” (Rebecca Shabad, The Hill)

The thirty Senate Democrats who have remained silent on the Iran sanctions bill are under pressure to stake out a position. (Greg Sargent, Washington Post)

AIPAC keeps a low profile on Iran bill. (Politico)

Obama threatens to veto additional Iran sanctions. (Anne Gearan, Washington Post)

Did Obama Deliberately Fail to Negotiate a Deal to Keep Troops in Iraq?

I n light of al-Qaeda’s recent gains and heightened sectarian violence in Iraq, President Obama has taken flack from many hawks in Congress for his failure to negotiate a long-term security agreement with Iraq that would have left U.S. forces in the country after 2011.

Yet the lack of a new security arrangement between the United States and Iraq was hardly a failure of diplomacy. While the Obama administration publicly supported the concept of keeping a residual force in Iraq; it deliberately failed to negotiate a new deal with Baghdad for domestic political reasons.

The hawks' attacks on this issue began over a week ago when Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsay Graham (R-SC) released a statement in which they severely admonished Obama for withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraq instead of leaving behind a residual force (a policy they strongly supported).

While most of the statement was boilerplate, it did contain a rather interesting and insightful tidbit:

Let it be clear that the Administration's narrative that Iraq's political leadership objected to U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after 2011 is patently false. We know firsthand that Iraq's main political blocs were supportive and that the Administration rejected sound military advice and squandered the opportunity to conclude a security agreement with Iraq that could have met U.S. military requirements..

Essentially two United States Senators are accusing the White House of concocting an entirely false account that a security agreement could not be reached because the Iraqis could not get their house in order.  

McCain and Graham don’t explicitly say why the Obama administration would do such a thing; but the sub-context is that the decision to withdrawal was politically motivated.

Oddly, I think McCain and Graham are pretty much correct. Here's why:

It is easy enough to see that it was in Obama’s domestic political interest to ensure every American in uniform was out of Iraq before the 2012 election. After all, it would be hard for Obama to claim he had fulfilled his campaign pledge and ended the Iraq War if there were still 10,000 or so troops stationed there.

The tricky part for Obama would be getting out of Iraq without seeming like he wanted to.

An overt policy to pull U.S. troops out before or at the end of 2011 without the support of Congressional hawks and the military would have looked cynical. It would have exposed Obama to blunt attacks that he was squandering the sacrifice of American blood and treasure, ignoring his military commanders, and allow his critics in the future to lay Iraq’s problems at his doorstep.

So there was little if any reason for the Obama administration to visibly go against the grain and oppose a long-term U.S. troop presence in Iraq. Such a political fight is best avoided if possible. And it was.

Rather, the Obama administration publicly supported the hawks and the military’s preferred policy for a residual force in Iraq. The administration’s support, however, was a political feint. I believe Obama wanted out of Iraq but masked his true policy preference in order to defuse criticism from the hawks while he maneuvered for a big political win with the moderates and doves long weary of the conflict.

Obama’s maneuver was brilliant in its simplicity: he would do nothing and let Iraq’s dysfunctional political system sink the prospects for a new security agreement. His hand would thus appear to be forced by Iraqi incompetence.

For years, the United States had taken on an indispensable and highly active role as the final arbitrator in Iraq’s chaotic politics. Even under Obama, the United States was routinely hammering together political agreements on issues large and small among the numerous Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish political factions who otherwise could agree on nothing but their mutual disdain for one another.

Yet when it came time to negotiate a new security agreement, the Obama administration did little if anything to ensure the Iraqis hashed out a deal amongst themselves over the arrangements' terms. The administration changed its tone just a bit, insisting it wanted to stay but only if the Iraqis could get their house in order on their own and ask.

The guiding hand of the United States which had brought a semblance of order and function to Iraq’s fragile government was suddenly lifted. U.S. officials merely watched from the sidelines as the Iraqis predictably spun their wheels over the issue and the calendar crept closer and closer to December 2011.

Once the deadline for a new deal expired in December 2011, Obama was able to pin the blame squarely on the Iraqis for being unable to get their ducks in a row on time. It's hard to imagine that if the United States—with all its power and influence in Iraq—had really wanted a deal it was incapable of twisting enough arms to get its way.

Nevertheless, Obama seized the opportunity to withdrawal the remaining U.S. forces under the political cover that absent a new agreement with Baghdad, he was merely following a timetable established by his Republican predecessor. Obama then took a bow during a national prime-time address in which he announced he had finally brought the war to a responsible and honorable end.

Oh well, just one more example of a sound policy abroad being sacrificed because it was bad domestic politics.

Assorted Interesting Links: 

Congress Wants to Kill Obama’s Iran Deal - Colum Lynch, John Hudson, Foreign Policy

Obama Threatens to Veto Iran Sanctions Bill - Howard LaFranchi, CSM

Iranian Hardline Faction Silent on Nuclear Deal - Thomas Erdbrink, New York Times

America Starts But Can’t Win Wars – Andrew J. Bacevich, LA Times

Democrats Oppose Reinvading Iraq. But…Why?

O n Thursday Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) joined in the chorus of critics slamming the Obama administration’s handling of Iraq policy after al-Qaeda militants seized two cities in Anbar last week.

Speaker Boehner argued the president needed to take a more active role on the issue and gave his support for sending military aid to Baghdad. He then added (or better yet quipped), “The administration has chosen to spend much of its time and energy trying to explain why having terrorists holding key terrain in the Middle East is not the president’s problem.”

Responding to questions about Boehner’s remarks, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said, “I know that Speaker Boehner opposed candidate Obama’s promise to end the war in Iraq.  I know that.  Maybe he still does. Maybe he thinks that American men and women in uniform ought to be fighting today in Anbar province. That’s a disagreement that may continue to exist…The president made a commitment to end the war in Iraq. He fulfilled that commitment.”

Wait what? Boehner did not call for troops to be sent to Iraq. Jay Carney is not the first to spin the debate in this manner.

Secretary of State John Kerry began this approach last week when he stated the United States would help the Iraqi government battle the al-Qaeda militants but added, “This is a fight that belongs to the Iraqis. That is exactly what the president and the world decided some time ago when we left Iraq, so we are not obviously contemplating returning. We are not contemplating putting boots on the ground.”

Then on Tuesday, House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD) also came out against redeploying U.S. troops to Iraq. It has since become a major talking point when discussing what the United States should do about the situation in Iraq.

Oddly, I cannot find a single Republican (or Democrat, policy expert or Iraqi leader for that matter) who has argued that the United States should send troops back into Iraq. Nevertheless, Obama administration officials and Congressional Democrats have repeatedly and often without prompt stated their objection to sending troops to Iraq over the last week.

Why are the Democrats so eager to oppose a policy no one has even suggested? I can think of two reasons.

The first is that the Democrats are simply covering their left flank and getting out ahead of a problem before it becomes one. Dovish and opportunist Democratic primary challengers might get anxious or otherwise misconstrue the facts when the Obama administration announces it is sending military support to Iraq. Stipulating up front there will be zero boots on the ground in the same breath shirks that.

The second reason is that the Obama administration and Congressional Democrats may want to bait Republican hawks into actually calling for troops to help the Iraqis (or otherwise criticize the no troops caveat.) Interestingly, the Republicans who have criticized the administration for prematurely withdrawing U.S. forces have so far stopped short of suggesting that troops should go back in. Rather, it is simply a shame they are no longer there to keep Iraq a peaceful democracy.  

If Republican hawks are going to attack Obama for withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq prematurely, it works in the Democrats favor to push the Republican’s towards the next logical policy step that follows indirect military support. You Republicans didn’t want the troops out in the first place? Please, please, please argue that you want to send them back.

Why? Well, it would make Republicans look hawkish to the point of foolishness and undermines their legitimate criticisms of Obama’s handling of Iraq.

Even better, it would make for a blockbuster argument (even just a single sound bite might do) for Congressional Democrats ahead of the midterms in November. Vote Democrat because the Republicans want to reinvade Iraq. Take a guess which party comes out ahead on that issue.