The Devil’s Dictionary of International Relations and Foreign Affairs, Part II

P art II:

 

COUP D'ETAT, n: In civil-military relations, the replacement of an abhorrent government with a well-armed abhorrent government.

STRATEGIC, adj. Used to declare the importance of an object or place whereas its uselessness was previously self-evident.

POST-COLD WAR, n: The point in time that marks the beginning of recorded history.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, n: In international relations, an anonymous group of nations linked only by the assumption that they wholeheartedly agree with the person using the term. The United States is not a member.

———. In rhetoric, a device used by undergraduates, politicians, journalists and other intellectuals as a substitute for actual inquiry or to avoid prattling off a list of irrelevant nations that would otherwise come across as considerably less forbidding.

STRATEGY, n. A new plan that will fail for reasons obvious at a later point in time. 

FOREIGN AID, n. A bribe that masquerades as charity.

REFUGEE CRISIS, n: The unwelcome intrusion of poor peoples into their neighbor’s territory.

The First Image Problem and Understanding Iran

W hile following developments in U.S.-Iran relations in recent months, I have been struck by the contrasting depictions of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the impact of his personality and beliefs on Tehran’s policy towards the United States.

It seems every scholar, analyst, expert, and journalist offers a slightly different take on Khamenei’s personality, beliefs, and influence. 

It’s strange that such opposing assessments exist of the same individual (let alone someone as prominent as Khamenei). Moreover, I find it interesting why Khamenei’s personality and worldview—studied by outsiders by dissecting his mountain of writings and speeches—are rarely, if ever, compared to his actual political conduct and policies.

If indeed Khamenei is an idiosyncratic revolutionary hardliner, how can this image be reconciled with the evidence that suggests he is also a pragmatist? If Khamenei is believes that the United States and Israel are truly evil, why would he allow his government to strike a deal with the devil? How can Khamenei be an iron-fisted ruler who wields immutable authority, while it is known he has faced many domestic challengers to his position and influence? If Khamenei is Iran’s ultimate decision maker, why does he so rarely make decisions? If Khamenei’s word is law, why does he more often than not obfuscate his views to such an extent that even other Iranian leaders are puzzled as to where he stands?      

These competing images of Khamenei and the questions surrounding the impact of his beliefs on Tehran’s foreign policy are hardly unique. Rather, it raises broader questions about why political scientists still have so few answers when it comes to understanding the influence of individuals in international relations (which Kenneth Waltz referred to as the first image).

The Devil’s Dictionary of International Relations and Foreign Affairs, Part I

I n a homage to Ambrose Bierce’s The Devil’s Dictionary (one of my favorite books), I’ve decided to provide my own satirical take on the peculiar phrases, nonsense euphemisms, and infuriating catchwords that comprise much of the ontology of international relations and foreign affairs. 

My goal is to post a weekly installment of a few words in addition to my normal posts.

So here's Part I:

CHARM OFFENSIVE: In international relations, a cunning strategy adapted from the behavior of young children which entails acting civil towards one’s adversaries in order to gain advantage. The most agreeable form of offensive.

ATMOSPHERICS, n.: In diplomacy, phenomena of unknown origins which govern the success or failure of international negotiations.

AMBASSADOR, n. In American politics, a diplomat in name only. One who in exchange for raising large sums of campaign money for the Administration is rewarded with an archaic title and an extended overseas vacation to an inconsequential destination.

SENIOR OFFICIAL: A member of a noble tribe of unnamed peoples whose natural habitat is in the corridors of high political office. Members are known to worship an elected official as their deity in order to meet their most basic survival instinct to bask in the political power of others.

LOW-LEVEL OFFICIAL: A member of a lesser tribe of unnamed peoples who inhabit the soul-crushing machinery of government.  They exist principally to provide misleading or erroneous information to the press.

The U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal—What Took So Long?

  I have been doing some reading on the history of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations this week and stumbled across an interesting piece by Dan Joyner.   

Joyner argues out that none of the concessions Iran made at Geneva in November were new or represented a major shift in Iranian policy. He notes, “…none of them, and not even their sum, is beyond what Iran had already offered in past negotiations, going back at least to 2005.” 

Indeed, the Arms Control Association has an excellent timeline of diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program and another listing all of the past proposals from the parties over the years that supports his point. It seems like the general parameters of an U.S.-Iran nuclear deal have been sitting on the table for nearly a decade, which begs the question of what exactly took so long for the sides to sign off on it?

Yousaf Butt, a scientist from the Federation of American Scientists, attributes the recent breakthrough to “improved atmospherics” which made the deal suddenly doable. I think what Butt really means by “improved atmospherics” is a change in the domestic politics in Washington and Tehran. 

From my perspective, the domestic political calendars in both Washington and Tehran have been unfortunately timed for many years (if not decades) which has made moving towards cooperation politically tedious at home for each nation’s leadership until very recently.

This has left me with a few additional questions, thoughts and observations worth considering:

(1)   While Iran’s nuclear policy was often fluctuating and opaque, U.S. policy towards Iran seems to have undergone clear shifts from “no nuclear weapons” to “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” again which align nicely with the U.S. election cycle. Iran, of course, has never been willing to accept a zero enrichment deal. This was partly because Iran does have the legal right to enrich uranium as part of a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and partly because enrichment became a hotly debated political issue between Tehran’s hawks and doves.

(2)  Did the latest U.S. and international economic sanctions have the affect everyone seems to think they did and brought Tehran to its knees and caused a major shift in Iran’s position? Or were sanctions domestic political cover for the Obama administration to please hawks in Congress while subtly shifting U.S. policy from “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” while claiming the sanctions worked?

(3)  Did Hassan Rouhani’s election really make the difference? Or was it Obama’s reelection and the quick onset of being second-term lame duck president with a hostile Congress that won’t move his domestic agenda forward an inch? (Or was it both?)