I have been doing
some reading on the history of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations this week and stumbled across an
interesting piece by Dan Joyner.
Joyner argues out that none of the concessions Iran made at Geneva in November were new or represented a major shift in Iranian policy. He notes, “…none of them, and not even their sum, is beyond what Iran had already offered in past negotiations, going back at least to 2005.”
Indeed, the Arms Control Association has an excellent timeline of diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program and another listing all of the past proposals from the parties over the years that supports his point. It seems like the general parameters of an U.S.-Iran nuclear deal have been sitting on the table for nearly a decade, which begs the question of what exactly took so long for the sides to sign off on it?
Joyner argues out that none of the concessions Iran made at Geneva in November were new or represented a major shift in Iranian policy. He notes, “…none of them, and not even their sum, is beyond what Iran had already offered in past negotiations, going back at least to 2005.”
Indeed, the Arms Control Association has an excellent timeline of diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program and another listing all of the past proposals from the parties over the years that supports his point. It seems like the general parameters of an U.S.-Iran nuclear deal have been sitting on the table for nearly a decade, which begs the question of what exactly took so long for the sides to sign off on it?
Yousaf Butt, a
scientist from the Federation of American Scientists, attributes
the recent breakthrough to “improved atmospherics” which made the deal suddenly
doable. I think what Butt really means by “improved atmospherics” is a change
in the domestic politics in Washington and Tehran.
From my perspective, the domestic political calendars in both Washington and Tehran have been unfortunately timed for many years (if not decades) which has made moving towards cooperation politically tedious at home for each nation’s leadership until very recently.
From my perspective, the domestic political calendars in both Washington and Tehran have been unfortunately timed for many years (if not decades) which has made moving towards cooperation politically tedious at home for each nation’s leadership until very recently.
This has left me
with a few additional questions, thoughts and observations worth considering:
(1) While Iran’s nuclear policy was often
fluctuating and opaque, U.S. policy towards Iran seems to have undergone clear shifts
from “no nuclear weapons” to “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” again which
align nicely with the U.S. election cycle. Iran, of course, has never been willing
to accept a zero enrichment deal. This was partly because Iran does have the
legal right
to enrich uranium as part of a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and partly because enrichment became a hotly
debated political issue between Tehran’s hawks and doves.
(2) Did the latest U.S. and international economic
sanctions have the affect everyone seems to think they did and brought Tehran
to its knees and caused a major shift in Iran’s position? Or were sanctions domestic
political cover for the Obama administration to please hawks in Congress while subtly
shifting U.S. policy from “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapons” while
claiming the sanctions worked?
(3) Did Hassan Rouhani’s election really make
the difference? Or was it Obama’s reelection and the quick onset of being
second-term lame duck president with a hostile Congress that won’t move his
domestic agenda forward an inch? (Or was it both?)
